Abstract-This paper studies retailer's decision and financial institution's decision based on the strategic customer when retailer accepts financial service from financial institutions. Research shows that financing rate increases with the wholesale price and the average rate of return on investment increasing and decreases with the retailer's own funds increasing, and retailer's ordering quantity with finance service is higher than that of without finance service, and retailer and financial institution both get more the expected profit, and strategic customers get more benefits. Finally, a numerical example is validated.
INTRODUCTION
Since the 2008 financial crisis, many enterprises in supply chain face shortage of fund due to the financial institutions' credit crunch increasing, while financial institutions worry about operation risk caused by excessive loan which affects their income increasing. What supply chain enterprises do to solve the shortage of fund and financial institutions to seek new-growing value point becomes problem to be solved by business circles and academic.
The concept of strategic customer describes the consumer buying behavior in real life [1] . Scholars study the strategic customer from different angles. Firstly, it is from the retailer's static or dynamic pricing mechanism. Aviv & Pazgal (2008) studied a retailer facing strategic customer how to dynamic price, their research shows strategic customer's behavior deprive retailer's additional gains due to part price discrimination [2] . Peng Zhi-qiang et al. (2008) results show that customer heterogeneity can influence the service provider's dynamic pricing strategy [3] . Peng & Xiong (2008) studied how retailers to dynamic price facing the strategic customer's valuation is uncertainty based on literature [3] , and pointed out that the retailer commitment to customers return can improve the retailers profit expectations [4] . Secondly, it is from how to reduce strategic customer waiting behavior. Shen & Su (2007) pointed out that retailers need to introduce new inventory and price mechanism to reduce strategic customer waiting behavior [5] . Thirdly, it is from the symmetry and asymmetry information. Elmaghraby et al. (2008) studied the retailer's optimal price mechanism when the strategic customer's psychological price is complete information and incomplete information [6] . These literatures are all assumed that the retailers have sufficient funds at the time of decision making, but not consider that the retailers may have insufficient funds.
As for the supply chain enterprises have a shortage of funds at the time of decision making, business circles and academia have put forward various concepts, such as the supply chain finance, financing warehouse, logistics bank, which are widely used in practice, for example China Material Storage and Transportation Company launched the impawning supervision business in 1999, UPS announced in 2007 that UPS would launch the "UPS Global Supply Chain Finance Scheme" with China Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank and China Merchants Bank. Huaxia Bank introduced financial supply chain service brand "win-win financing chain" in 2008. Many scholars also have put forward many solutions [7~10] . Zhou Jian-heng (2010) analyzed financing and repurchases the simultaneous presence of supply chain decision, his results showed that suppliers in supply chain can coordination order quantity through the buy-back contract, the whole supply chain performance improved compared with that of without loans when bank loans to retailers [11] . The above literatures do not consider strategic customer in supply chain.
Based on literature [10] , this paper studies the optimal strategy for the retailer's decision and the financial institution's decision based on strategic customer when the retailer has fund shortage. The contribution of this paper is focused on two aspects: (1) the optimal strategy for the retailer's decision and the financial institution's decision based on strategic customer without financing service; (2) the optimal strategy for the retailer decision and the financial institution's decision based on strategic customer with financing service, we reveal how the strategic customer consumption behavior and the shortage of fund effect on the enterprise operating and financial institutions. Results shows that financing rate increases with wholesale price and the average rate of return on investment in capital market increasing and with retailer's own fund decreasing; retailer's ordering quantity is higher, the expected profit of retailer and financial institution are larger, strategic customers get more benefits than that with no-financing service. These are consistent with the actual situation.
II. MODEL ASSUMPTION
We assume a supplier offers Q unit single product to retailer with fixed wholesale price w. Retailer in the procurement process has its own fund B for the procurement. Market demand is uncertain, its density function is f(D), cumulative distribution function is F(D) which is guide and continuous, strictly increaseing, and    
Before the sales cycle starts, the retailer who has insufficient fund can get financing service wQ-B from financial institution in the competition of capital market financing service to order goods quantity; then the retailer has to fixed retail price p facing the homogeneous strategic customer whose consumer utility is U con . At the end of the sales cycle, the retailer pay back for financial institution's financing service L 1 =min[pmin [D, Q] , (wQ-B)(1+r)], which r is financing rate. Consumer is strategic customers. ψ is the consumer psychologycal price. ξ prob is the probability which the consumers within product processing buy the product, ξ ψ is the estimated consum-er psychological price. Superscript R notes the retailer.  is the retailer's expected profit. * is the optimal stra e product salvage value is zero. Retailer has optimal strategy.
III. THE OPTI
TAILER AND FINANCIAL e, price strategy game is made between retailer and customer.
A.
condition between strategic customer and retailer is as follow
We simplify formula (1) as follow tegy.
For the convenience of study, this paper assumes that th
Retailer facing a shortage of fund has two choices, one is not accept financing from or apply to financial institutions, the other is financing from financial institutions. From realistic point of view, the retailer based on maximization of his own interests chooses whether to accept financing from or apply to financial institutions, namely, retailer's profit with financing from financial institution is at least equal to that with no-financing. In either cas
Price Game between Retailer and Strategy Customer
According to the literature [12] conclusion, during the sale season, if the retail price meet to U con -p ≥ U con ξ prob , strategic customer will buy product from retailer immediately instead of waiting. The price equilibrium
escribes the retail price p is a function of ord eds to decide t tailer applies for financing, the financial institution's expected return is equal to the average investment return in capital market which is B)(1+ r f ), r ≥ r f . Financing rate satisfies    er quantity Q.
After the price game between retailer and strategic customer, retailer needs to decide whether to finance from financial institution according to his own fund. If the retailer decides to apply to financial institution, financial institution ne he financing rate.
B. Financial Institution's Financing Rate Policy
During the sale season, the average market investment rate of return in competitive capital market r f can be viewed as a fixed numerical value. As long as the re
is the profit and loss balance point , and do not know the relationnsh (II) if the financing institution know the retail price p and order quantity Q, respectively, and do know the relationship between retail price and order quantity, of financial institution.
For formula (3) , there are two cases:
(I) if the financing institution only knows the retail price and order quantity, respectively ip between retail price and order quantity, then the financeing institution's financing rates can be calculated according to proposition 1 in literature [10] ;
Since this paper concerns strategic customer, so we dismiss the case (I) and discuss the case (II).
Substituting the formula (2) into formula (3), we get r Theorem 1 Financing rate r * increases with the wholesale pric on investment in capital ma r's own fund increaseing.
Proof: From formula (3), we have e and the average rate of return rket increasing, and decreases with retaile
By taking G partial derivative for B, w, r * and r f , respectively, and we get
Then we have
ncreasing, and increases with retailer order quantity increasing.
Proof：By taking G partial derivative for U con and Q, respectively, we have
Theorem 2
If G>0, then the financing rates decreases with consumer utility i
From analysis in case (I) and (II), financial institution in ncing decision, which has (wQ fina choice of financing is not possible, so there must have z < Q.
After the sales cycle ends, the retailers obtain sa these two cases may make different fina the same characteristics with the literature [10] .
C. Retailer's Optimal Order Strategy
After the retailer receives financing service, if z ≥ Q then -B) ≥ (p-w)Q+B which means that retailer's paying back to ncial institution is more than his sales profit, the retailer's les profit is
Retailer's expected profit is
We substitute the formula (2) into the formula (5), and then simplify the formula (5) as follow
By taking  R  the first derivative for Q, and then sim fyin plig, we get
Theorem 3 The retailer's optimal order quantity Q * satisfyies as follow
Next, we discuss the characters of retailer's optimal ordering uantity.
We define ilers and the strategy of consumer, retailer is needed to pay back the financing cost, from the formula (6), so he must subdivide an sumer utility is greater than the minimum critical value.
Corollary 2 If
con U is fixed, we define
as the maximum critical value of average market investment rate of return in competitive capital market, so it have r fma et dem fixed; otherwise ret iler will not in e must be less t maximum critical value of average market investment rate of return in com of sim si of t he B China).
Last, we compare the retailer's optimal order quantity with strategi n-strategic customer.When the consumer is non-strategic, we have the retailer's optimal order quantity x >r f (>0). Corollary 2 shows the financial institutions can not be unlimited raising financing rate from the visual point of view when the mark and is a apply for financ g. 
plify the abo We sim ve formula and then get
quantity with strategic consumer is lower than that with nonstrategic consumer. Thus we have the theorem 5.
Theorem 5
The retailer's optimal order quantity with strategic customer is lower than that with non-strategic customer.
D. CASE EXAMPLE
We use a numerical example to illustrate our results. We assume D∈U [0, 1000] We first calculate the retailer's optimal decision without inanci rin f al service. The retailer's expected profit and optimal ordeg quantity are shown in Figure 1 and Table 1 , respectively. From Table 1 , we can see that the optimal ordering quantity with financial service is larger than that of without financial service, and at least more than B/w.
The financing rate is shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 illustrates that the financing rate increases with consumer utility increasing when retailer's own fund is fixed and that the financing rate decreases with retailer's own fund increasing when consumer utility fixed. The retailer's expected profit is shown in Figure 3 . Figure 3 illustrates that the retailer's expected profit increases with consumer utility increasing when retailer's own fund is fixed and that the retailer's expected profit increases with retailer's own fund increasing when consumer utility fixed.
The financial institution's expected profit is shown in Fig  ure 4 .
- Figure 4 illustrates that the financial institution's expected profit increases with consumer utility increasing when retailer's own fund is fixed and that he financial institution's expected profit decreases with retailer's own fund increasing when ing quantity with finance service is higher than that of without finance service; retailer and financial in consumer utility fixed.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper studies retailer's decision and financial institution's decision based on the strategic customer when retailer accepts financial service from financial institutions. Research shows that financing rate increases with the wholesale price and the average rate of return on investment increasing and decreases with the retailer's own funds increasing; retailer's orderstitution both get more the expected profit; strategic customers get more benefits. Finally, a numerical example et financing services provide financial i, Li Hao, "Service providers pricing or cancellations," International Conference on Service is validated.
In future research, as the literature [10] pointed out "the hypotheses of capital mark institutions are risk neutral, if the change of this hypothesis have different conclusions", therefore, risk-preference financial titution's decision behavior is the next research d ins irection. Then, how a risk-preference decision maker of financial institution and risk preference of decision makers of supply chain influences on the operation of supply chain and financial institution is the further research direction.
